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THE CHINESE AND THEIR REVOLUTIONS 
I want to put before you some very general, rather discursive 
reflections about the revolutionary process that has occurred 
in China over the past 100 years or so. What else indeed can I 
do, or you expect, given my very open-ended and wide rang-
ing title which, like some political manifesto, seems to promise 
a great deal without pointing to anything in particular? 
That title is, as I am sure many of you will have recognised, 
adapted from the book by Thomas Taylor Meadows first publish-
ed in the middle of last century, The Chinese and Their 
Rebellions. The Chinese and Their Revolutions was suggested 
to me as a subject for this lecture by someone who knew of my 
interest in Meadows and in the immense Taiping movement of 
revolt in China of which he was a close and committed observer. 
Of course I found it very difficult to resist so capacious a title 
which was also for me a gesture of recognition towards a man in 
whom I had long been interested and whose ideas are, I think, 
of some continuing value for students of China. Prudence did 
subsequently suggest to me that something rather less open-
ended, less likely to lead towards a morass of generalities or 
banalities, might be politic, since this is the annual Morrison 
lecture and I had by chance recently been reading up on 
Morrison's career in order to write the entry on him for the 
next volume of the Australian Dictionary of Biography. Some-
thing on his career and ideas, his warnings and prognosti-
cations about Australia's future relations with China and Japan, 
for example, would be appropriate and a good deal more precise. 
But prudence soon guided me away from such an alternative 
because, although I had been asked to be the author of the 
brief Dictionary of Biography entry on Morrison, I was acutely 
aware that there are several others, including a recent lecturer 
in this series, far better qualified than I to lecture about 
Morrison. So I decided to stay with Meadows and my large, 
imprecise title. 
However, let me at least at this point pay my respects to 
George Ernest Morrison, that vigorous, independent and 
courageous Australian observer of China who in 1894, half a 
century after Meadows on whom I will have much more to say, 
also made his way independently and experimentally to China, 
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then spent nearly the whole of the rest of his life there and 
became like Meadows, an acute, informed and sympathetic 
observer of, and indeed to some extent participant in, the 
developments he observed and reported on. Meadows and 
Morrison were in many respects very different kinds of men. 
The first never married and appears never to have been close 
to any woman - or man, for that matter - whereas Morrison, 
although he married late, was never indifferent to the opposite 
sex and had a wide circle of friends and correspondents. Again, 
Meadows was a prolix, pedantic kind of writer, whereas Morrison 
was a master of the succinct, direct report. But both believed 
in being if possible on the spot; were prepared to make risky 
and lengthy journeys to get there and then to do their best to 
report their observations fully and accurately, not omitting 
some vigorous expression of their own views; both, too, were 
deeply concerned for the future of China and prepared to com-
mit their personal futures to working in that country; and, 
finally, both left behind them much writing of worth and con-
tinuing interest to students of China. Had the years between 
not made it impossible I think it probable they would have been 
interested to have met one another - for a short time at least! 
I am glad to have had the chance, through the historical record, 
to have come to know both of them a little and to have this 
opportunity of paying them some tribute. 
When I came to grapple with the task of, as it were, up-
dating Meadows I began to wonder whether I should not have 
adapted his title less ambitiously, in the way that Jonathan 
Spence appears to have done in his recent book The Gate of 
Heavenly Peace which is sub-titled The Chinese and Their 
Revolution, 1895-1980, i.e. in the singular and with definite 
dates. From many points of view, let me admit it early on, it 
makes much sense to look at the long struggle of the Chinese 
people to reorganise and establish themselves in the modern 
world as one revolution, protracted and complex of course, but 
in essence a bloc, a single ongoing process, the Chinese rev-
olution of modern times. Meadows, had he been writing in mid-
twentieth rather than mid-nineteenth century, would certainly 
have recognised the reality of revolution, as distinct from mere 
rebellion, in China, but I am sure he would also have still 
emphasised the immense strength of the entrenched traditions, 
values and institutions of Chinese society and the limits imposed 
on any revolutionary movement within such a tradition. One of 
the main ideas I want to try to convey tonight is to suggest 
that, although from one perspective it certainly helps make 
sense of the complexities and conflicts within modern Chinese 
history to see these as basically aspects of one single great 
revolution, yet at the same time that there are difficulties and 
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distortions inherent in such a view; that we ought, if it is his-
torical truth that we are after, to keep eyes and minds alert to 
the limitations of any tightly focused, single-pathed perspect-
ive on the modern Chinese revolution. I want to question a 
little - 'challenge' would be too strong or ambitious a word -
the view that, in the words of the French writer Lucien Bianco 
in his lucid and stimulating study Origins of the Chinese Rev-
olution 'we all know there was only one Chinese revolution and 
that it took place in 1949'. 1 I am perhaps rather overstating 
any counter case I may be able to mount by using the term 
revolution in the plural in my title, but am sure you will at 
least agree that, if there is indeed an historical entity we can 
call the Chinese revolution it has been, and still is, a many-
headed phenomenon which seems at times to move in very dif-
ferent if not downright contrary directions. 
But before I venture further into this line of argument I 
would like to say a few words about Meadows' career in an 
effort to give some substance to the man whose ideas I am bor-
rowing freely. He was born in Northern England in 1819 and 
went to Germany when about twenty to study science and phil-
osophy, but once there became caught up by the study of 
Chinese. In 1842 he made his way to Hong Kong and, students 
of Chinese being then very rare indeed though much needed 
to help operate the new treaty system created after the first 
opium war, he was at once appointed as Interpreter in the new 
Consulate at Canton. He proved to be an energetic, rouragoous 
and scholarly servant of the Crown, becoming very proficient 
in the language. makinq quite danqerous intelligence-gather-
ing forays into the environs of Canton. He published, in 
1847, his first book, an excellent collection of essays on the 
administrative system of China. 2 He also wrote the first 
official British reports on the Taiping rebellion which had 
broken out in south China about 1850. In 1852 he was trans-
ferred to Shanghai, and was there when the Taiping suddenly 
launched themselves northward to the Yangtze valley and cap-
tured Nanjing. As Interpreter at the nearest British Consul-
ate to the new rebel capital Meadows became the first Western-
er to make direct contact with the Taiping when a British nav-
al vessel sailed to Nanjing in May 1853. Meadows' experience 
at Canton had made him very hostile to the ruling Manchu 
dynasty and its bureaucracy, and he was predisposed to sym-
pathy for any rebels against them. The Taiping, with their 
quasi-Christian religious faith and their program of land and 
other reforms seemed to him, as to many others at that time, 
to hold out promise of a rejuvenated, less conservative, less 
anti-western China, and he became an advocate of their cause. 
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Most other Westerners fairly soon abandoned hopes in the 
Taiping, coming to see them as blasphemous and destructive 
fanatics (a kind of Khmer Rouge of the nineteenth century), 
even less open to Western ideas about trade and diplomacy than 
was the ruling dynasty. After the second opium war and the 
forcing of a more extended treaty system in 1860 from the 
Manchus, the British and French governments soon began help-
ing to suppress the rebel movement. Meadows however per-
sisted in seeing reforming potential in it, and consistently 
opposed the emerging Western tendency towards intervention. 
His major book, The Chinese and Their Rebellions - part a 
description of the movement as he had observed it, part a 
general philosophical-historical disquisition on Chinese civili-
sation, part a plea for continued Western neutrality - was 
published in 1856, by which time Western hopes in the Taiping 
were fast fading. The book was no best seller, but is still a 
respected text (perhaps more respected than read) and was 
reprinted a few years ago. Meadows must have been bitterly 
disappointed in its reception, however, as he was also in his 
attempts, continued when he was British consul at Shanghai 
in 1860-6]., to influence British policy away from intervention. 
He spent his last years in the consular service in what turned 
out to be a remote and unrewarding post in .riorth China and 
died there, still a scholar and a recluse, in 1868. 
Although deeply concerned for China, and a profound 
student of its history and culture, Meadows can fairly be des-
cribed as an agent of Western imperialism in China. His job, 
after all, was to help administer the unequal treaties that 
resulted from the opium wars; he was not particularly critical 
of the opium trade, seeing it as a fact of life; and he was 
capable of acting in a high handed, even violent way, towards 
the Chinese. But he also sought to convince his far from 
receptive fellow countrymen that there were great qualities and 
strengths within Chinese culture, even lessons to be learned 
from it; that high civilisation was not, and never had been, a 
Western monopoly. His whole career illustrates the double-
sided nature of the Western - more specifically the British -
imperialist presence in China in the mid-nineteenth century. 
He was an admirer of Chinese civilisation, yet he was also, by 
virtue of his position and the forces he represented, a dis-
rupter of it. He sought consistently to study its achievements 
and to understand its strengths, but he was also helping put 
before it the dilemma of modernisation; helping in fact to import 
revolution into China and to compound and complicate its own 
long tradition of political change through rebellion which fas-
cinated him so much. I do not wish to imply here that revolu-
tion in modern Chinese history was primarily an importation. 
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It stemmed strongly from purely internal and domestic roots, 
not least the immense pressure of population on limited re-
sources that was steadily mounting by the mid-nineteenth 
century. But the forms revolution was to take, the programs 
it would develop, and to some extent the idea itself, was cer-
tainly in some sense being brought into China by Meadows and 
his Western contemporaries, very few of whom were at all 
sensitive to what was happening to the country on which they 
had imposed themselves. Meadows called his book The Chinese 
and Their Rebellions, but it is a book which implicitly explores 
the possibility of revolution within that great tradition which 
he respected so deeply. 
Meadows is possibly best remembered today as the author 
of a striking bon mot about Chinese history. Early on in his 
rambling book of 650 pages he wrote: 'Of all nations that have 
attained a certain degree of civilization the Chinese are the 
least revolutionary and the most rebellious. Speaking gen-
erally there has been but one great political revolution in China, 
when the centralised form of government was substituted for 
the feudal about 2, OOO years ago'.~ The least revolutionary, 
the most rebellious; only one great revolution in over 2, OOO 
years of history. Meadows wrote those words when Westerners 
generally saw China as a very static society, 'the land of the 
eternal standstill', as one German scholar of the time put it. 
Meadows himself, although concerned to argue the compara-
bility and indeed, in certain respects, the superiority of 
Chinese civilisation over Western, seems to have shared this 
view to a significant extent. It was forcefully and facetiously 
put by The Times reviewer of his book who, with character-
istic mid-Victorian confidence, was far more amused than 
impressed by Meadows' attempts to illustrate the high achieve-
ments - moral, administrative, philosophical - evident in Chinese 
history, writing that 'the geological transformation of the 
earth's surface affords a fair parallel to China's advancement. 
Coal is made quicker than Chinese ethics and continents grow 
while their philosophers sleep'. 4 Clearly in such a history 
nothing very much happened, certainly nothing revolutionary 
- although I suppose even The Times reviewers would have to 
admit that the earth does sometimes move. 
I do not wish to attempt to range over the preceding 2, OOO 
years of Chinese history that Meadows was looking back upon 
in order to test the validity of his aphorism. However I do 
wish to illustrate the tenacity of this view of China's pre-
modern history and to make some general comment on it. 
Barrington Moore in his hi<;tllyregarded comparative analysis 
entitled The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 
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comments, with the T aiping movement mainly in mind, that the 
mid-nineteenth century saw one of what he called the periodic 
reappearances of internal decay evidenced by major rebellion 
in Chinese history, and added a footnote stating 'Modern sin-
ologists are prone to deny that Chinese history has been 
fundamentally unchanged for two thousand years, asserting 
that this is an illusion due to our ignorance. Nevertheless to 
a nonspecialist it seems quite obvious that, in comparison with 
Europe, Chinese civilisation did remain largely static. What 
changes are there in China comparable to the Western sequence 
of city state, world empire, feudalism, royal absolutism, and 
modern ind ustiral society. Take architecture: is there in 
China any variety over time comparable to the Parthenon, the 
cathedral at Chartres, Versailles, the skyscraper?'. 5 
This static view of China's pre-modern history is tenacious 
- at least among non-China specialists - perhaps because there 
may after all be some kind of basis for it. But it is a view 
which may also have as much validity if applied to other pasts 
than China's, and even be applicable to quite long stretches 
of our own Western past. A visitor to planet Earth from Mars 
arriving somewhere between the seventh to twelfth centuries 
of our Christian era would have been likely to have seen 
China as a more dynamic, expanding, outward-looking centre 
of civilised society than Western Europe. It is surely mis-
leading to assume that a history that does not have many of 
the kind of signposts set up by historians to guide (or mis-
guide) us through the thickets of our own West European 
history - signposts pointing to such territories of the mind 
as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolu-
tion, or to such dramatic events as the storming of a Bastille, 
a Tuileries or a Winter Palace, events which result in obvious, 
immediate and radical political change - it is surely false to 
assume that such a history is in any real sense necessarily 
'largely static', as Moore puts it. Even if we agree that there 
were fewer such apparently rapid and far-reaching cultural, 
economic or political shifts as we are accustomed, from the 
history books, to find in our own tradition (and appearances 
there can, of course, be very deceptive), we should remain 
aware that all change and development, including revolutionary 
change, is relative. We should recognise that traditional 
Chinese history, though apparently much less mobile when 
viewed from certain angles than Western hi.story of the past 
five or six centuries - we must leave aside the twentieth -
should not be distorted into some kind of flat and featureless 
plain where nothing much moves. 
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The rise of what is termed gentry society; the southward 
moving frontier of Chinese settlement; the economic and com-
mercial expansion of China in Sung times before 'the high 
equilibrium trap' closed in; the development of the civil ser-
vice examination system as a path to power and status and a 
mechanism of some degree of social mobility - all these and 
other developments may be called upon to underline the point 
that significant change, even if we do not see it as revolution-
ary change, was going on through the long and apparently 
repetitious sweep of the Chinese dynastic cycle. China's long 
history superficially may not be the most dynamic or revolu-
tionary of the major traditions of civilisation, but it is not 
therefore truly static. Such a view of China's past distorts by 
conditioning the mind to expect far more from revolution than 
is likely, in practical and human terms, to be realisable, 
especially within so deep and lasting a tradition of civilisation 
as China's. Meadows, although he did not live to see modern 
revolution come to China, understood that well. 
One kind of change which is recognised by all observers to 
be present in China's history is, of course, the regular dynas-
tic cycle - the periodic shift of the mandate of heaven from one 
ruling imperial house to some other, often after a lengthy inter-
vening period of political instability and struggle between rival 
would-be successors. It is worth remembering at this point 
that the modern word for revolution in Chinese derives from 
this traditional concept of a mandate. Ke-ming, is an old term, 
first used in the I Ching or Book of Changes, and sub-
sequently in some of the dynastic histories and other classics. 6 
Mathews dictionary gives a rather characteristic, Mathews-type 
definition, i. e. one which both illuminates and confuses the 
mind - 'to deprive a ruling dynasty of the divine right to rule; 
used for revolution or any reform which, strictly speaking, is 
not a revolution'. Certainly today it means only revolution, 
not reform, and I do not mean to suggest that modern Chinese, 
when they use the term, consciously break it down into its 
constituent characters and say to themselves 'Ah yes! the 
shedding of the mandate', nor that they hear echoes of the old 
matching term tian-ming, the mandate of heaven. Yet it is of 
some interest to note that the language, by using an old term 
for a modern concept, seems still to preserve something of the 
old notion that any major change of political rulers is in cer-
tain respects like (though it may in many respects be also very 
unlike) previous political change. Maybe in this way it pre-
serves a scrap of the national collective unconscious - if you 
can accept the validity of such a concept. Our own word 
'revolution also had an original meaning of a circular movement 
back to the original starting point, a meaning still evident 
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when we speak of the revolutions of the planets or of engines. 
As a social and political term of course it now means only change 
to a new and quite different system. But even in our own lan-
guage, and possibly more strongly in the Chinese, there re-
mains a remnant of the older meaning, a hint of ambiguity in 
the word, as there is in the historical reality of revolutions, 
whether they occur in China or elsewhere. 
Crane Brinton remarked at the start of his classic com-
parative study of four major revolutions, the English, American, 
French and Russian, first published nearly fifty years ago and 
entitled The Anatomy of Revolution, that revolution is one of 
the looser words, often hardly more than an emphatic synonym 
for change. 7 There is now a much larger historical, thooretical 
and analytical literature on revolutions in the modern word, 
and many more sophisticated - though not, I think, more read-
able - comparative studies than when Brinton wrote. I do not 
intend to venture far into that literature here, nor to make any 
earnest attempt at a scholarly definition of the term. I certainly 
need to keep my own usage loose! Rather than defining I 
want to ruminate around the concept a little., However, given 
my title and its source, some consideration of the word and of 
its alternative, 'rebellion' seems unavoidable and, naturally, I 
turn first to Meadows for ideas and guidance. 
At the beginning of the paragraph which concludes with 
the ban mat already quoted, Meadows mtired certain conflicting 
views given of China and its history by different writers. 
By some [he wrote] we have enforced on our 
attention the fondness of the Chinese for the 
old, and the unchangeableness of their 
institutions. Others dilate, on the contrary, 
on the constant rise and fall of dynasties and 
on the internal conflicts which accompany them, 
till we are tempted to think the Chinese the 
most unstable and revolutionary people in the 
world. 
Meadows found the source of this conflict in what he called the 
undistinguishing use of words. 
The words are in this case 'revolution' and 
'rebellion', which have been constantly 
interchanged as synonyms, yet refer to two 
essentially different kinds of acts. Revolution 
is a change of government and of the principles 
on which it rests, and does not necessarily 
imply a change of rulers. Rebellion is a 
rising against the rulers which, far from 
necessarily aiming at a change of govern-
mental principles and forms, often originates 
in a desire of preserving them intact. 
Revolutionary movements are against 
principles, rebellions against men. 8 
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Thus, for Meadows revolution was a change in the principles 
of government not necessarily involving a change of the men in 
power, though it commonly did this; it may in fact come from 
them, from above. The example he goes on to cite is seven-
teenth century England, stating that it was the revolutionary 
tendencies of Charles I that made his subjects rebels. This is 
not the prevailing view of the seventeenth century English 
Revolution today, but it is worth remembering that for long 
the Puritan revolt that overthrew Charles I was known as the 
Great Rebellion, and that the subsequent so-called Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 in English history was so called because it 
supposedly restored, without another civil war resulting, the 
old balance between Crown and Parliament which had been dis-
turbed by Charles I and later again by James II. The word 
revolution there is used in its original sense of a restoration 
or return to old, approved principles. In the Chinese context 
Meadows saw a right to rebel, and thereby to transfer the 
mandate to another dynasty, as central to the balance and 
health of the political system. Rebellion is 'the storm that 
clears and invigorates a political atmosphere which has become 
sultry and unwholesome'. Whatever doubts the modern 
historian may have about the reality of any right to rebel 
within the Chinese tradition, for Meadows there certainly was 
some corrective mechanism within that tradition which he 
called the right to rebel and which preserved, over time, a 
basic social and political balance and harmony by preventing 
autocracy becoming a fixed despotism. 
In this respect, Meadows suggested, China was very 
different from Russia. 
The Russian autocracy [he wrote] is a 
despotism, not only because it is supported 
by great physical force but, what is still 
more terrible, because the whole intellectual 
power is possessed by the rulers. The 
Chinese government is not a despotism 
[he went on] but an autocracy existing 
in virtue of the cheerful acquiescence of 
the people. The latter actually do share 
largely in a kind of self-government in 
consequence of the mandarins being taken 
impartially from all classes. 9 
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Rebellion and competitive examinations were for Meadows the 
two main institutions which had, over time, kept Chinese soc-
iety so remarkably stable. This is certainly an idealised but 
not, I think, totally false view of the Chinese political trad-
ition. Recent developments in China do suggest that there may 
be some truth in Meadows' belief in a fundamental contrast 
between the Russian and Chinese polities, and thereby in 
their revolutions. Superficially, then as now, China and 
Russia may appear to have comparable authoritarian political 
systems, the result in the twentieth century of apparently 
comparable revolutions. But it seems there is still, somewhere 
in the new China as in the old, a greater degree of flexibility 
allowing even yet a more effective, though certainly by our 
standards a far from complete or adequate, flow upwards from 
governed to governing than is apparent in the other great 
communist autocracy. For example, a recent analysis of the 
Production Responsibility System and the Future of Collective 
Farming in China concludes that 'official policy has appeared 
to develop more slowly than peasant practice; the authorities 
were constantly in the position of having to sanction trends in 
the countryside which, at each stage required further con-
cessions from the previous position. The process was one of 
gradually reconciling policy with practice'. The writers of 
this article comment that, at least in the region they observed, 
there was on this matter 'a momentum independent of central 
authority' and considered that any attempt by government to 
reverse that momentum would meet with strong resistance. 1 0 
I shall come back to this question of popular, especially 
peasant, pressures on the course of revolution in China, and 
here merely observe that whereas Russia, thirty years after 
the death of Stalin, seems to remain firmly fixed in an estab-
lished pattern of revolutionary authority, China thirty years 
after the triumph of the Communist Party seems as yet to have 
settled much less firmly into any new revolutionary orthodoxy, 
to be still a society testing the limits and nature of its revolu-
tion and still capable, however slowly, laboriously, uncertainly, 
of influencing the new autocracy - and I am not suggesting that 
it will cease to be that - by mass pressures if not by overt 
rebellion from below. Rebellion, like revolution, may take many 
forms and operate to many different degrees. Is it altogether 
fanciful to suggest that there may still be some kind of correct-
ive system, some surviving institutional capacity, to clear and 
invigorate a political atmosphere which has become 'sultry and 
unwholesome', as Meadows put it, and to turn autocratic gov-
ernment, whether of emperor or party, away from draconian 
despotism? In short, I suggest, following Meadows, that party-
led revolution in China is likely always to be more tempered 
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than is possible in Russia by that long tradition of major rebel-
lion from below, though of course in a modernising China it is 
unlikely to be rebellion quite of the traditional kind. But 
revolution in China has not necessarily made rebellion totally 
redundant or anachronistic. 
Meadows was a contemporary of Marx though not, I think, 
in any way influenced by, or aware of, any of that great 
theorist's writings. Meadows does refer at one point in his 
book to modern communism, pointing out that Taiping com-
munism was certainly not of that kind, though just what 
Meadows meant by modern communism is unclear. 11 In Marxist 
and Marxist-related theories revolution is usually seen as funda-
mentally a social phenomenon whereby a previously subordin-
ated and oppressed class (another of the looser words) breaks 
the bonds of the old order and establishes a new socio-political 
system at a supposedly higher stage of historical development, 
so creating a new order in which the basic productive forces 
of society are more fully liberated. Thus, through revolution 
- the locomotive of history, as Marx called it - human society 
moves nearer to that ideal society in which the principle 'from 
each according to his ability to each according to his needs' 
will ultimately prevail. It is a now very familiar theory, a 
splendid vision which has led many men to do terrible things 
to other men in pursuit of it. Theda Skcopol in her recent, 
well received, comparative study States and Social Revolution 
defines social revolution as the rapid basic transformation of a 
society's state and class structures accompanied, and then in 
part carried through, by class-based revolt from below. Rebel-
lion, she adds, may involve the revolt of subordinate classes 
but does not eventuate in structural change; political revolu-
tions transform state structures but not social structures. 
'What is unique to social revolution' she says 'is that basic 
changes in social structure and in political structure occur 
together and in a mutually reinforcing fashion'. Such revolu-
tions are 'rare but momentous occurrences' of which there are 
relatively few historical instances. The major ones so far are 
those of France, Russia and China. Skcopol would, I am sure, 
agree with Bianco that there has really been only one revolu-
tion in modern Chinese history and 1949 was its climax. 12 
One of my reservations about this kind of model is that it 
seems to me to induce a kind of triumphalist, Whiggish view of 
modern Chinese history, even in learned and sophisticated 
analyses such as those of Skcopol and Bianco, not to mention 
the 'all-kotow-to-Mao' school of historical and political writing 
- a triumphalist interpretation which does not fit all the facts, 
including many of the basic facts, whether of before or after 
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1949. Later in her book Skcopol writes that 'ultimately the 
Chinese Revolution could be completed only when some revolu-
tionary leaders learned to tap the enormous insurrectionary 
productive and political energies of the peasant majority'. 13 
Now it is certainly true that by 1949 the Communist Party had 
learned, far better than its political and military rival for 
power, the Kuomintang, to organise the peasant masses for 
their revolutionary ends. But words like 'completed' and 'taps' 
suggest a degree of finality and of control in the process 
which I believe is exaggerated and indeed distorting of the 
reality, both then and since. Such judgments and general-
isations gloss over the complex, uncertain balance, which 
exists to some degree within all revolutions, between the 
leaders and the led; between the revolutionary elite and the 
masses - masses who may, indeed, be themselves quite revolu-
tionary, and supportive of certain of the objectives of the 
revolutionary elite leadership, but who are not therefore 
necessarily, in the longer term, looking to the same kind of 
revolution. Writers like Bianco and Skcopol are certainly not 
unaware of such contrasts and tensions within the complex-
ities of the history of the Chinese Revolution.111 But the main 
thrust of their analyses and conclusions is, I think, to suggest 
that there was by 1949 a degree of fusion of revolutionary ele-
ments and aspirations, a degree of finality about the achieve-
ment and nature of the revolution and about its capacity to 
transform state and class structures, to use Skcopol' s terms, 
which subsequent events and other evidence suggests was in 
fact far from the case. One of the most forthright statements 
of the paradigm I am questioning is provided by Leon Stover 
in his lively book The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization, 
where he states that the 'rulers of communist China, in pro-
jecting their ideological culture downward, have provided a 
common denominator for the peasantry as well, moving it from 
folk society to mass society. The peasantry as such has 
ceased to exist now that villages are participants in a national 
culture'. 15 Has it really been so final and neat, one wonders? 
Was the peasant class mobilised and moved forward 'tfansformed' 
quite so firmly and completely? Has there perhaps been some 
kind of slow but effective peasant pressure - 'rebellion' -
turning the revolution towards less transforming, more trad-
itional looking structures? Is it really the same revolution as 
it appears to be in the history books celebrating 1949? 
Well, of course, in some sense it clearly is. It is still the 
same party in power with the same avowed socialist ideologies 
and objectives. But the directions in which it is heading 
towards those objectives and the means it is employing to 
achieve them do seem to be unexpected, very different from 
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what they once were. Fox Butterfield, in his recent book 
Alive in the Bitter Sea, quotes a party official in Yunnan as 
recently saying 'We are having trouble defining what our sys-
tem is, we are trying a number of experiments. Those that 
work we will call socialism, those that don't we will call capital-
ism'. 16 One could, I suppose read that as a sort of Chinese-
Irish joke, but it has the ring of authenticity about it; a gen-
uine definition of what Chinese socialism will indeed be like. If 
revolution is the locomotive of history, as Marx said, have the 
Chinese somehow got on board a runaway engine of change 
which is heading who knows where exactly? It seems at times 
rather like the locomotive put on film by that other great 
Marxist, Groucho, in 'The Marx Brothers go West', which 
dashed off through paddocks, herds of cows, farm buildings 
and so on, practially everywhere save through a recognisable 
railway station! Revolutions can be like that, and commonly are 
at some stage. The Chinese Revolution, if it is still the same 
revolution that began in 1895, to take Spence's starting date, 
and climaxed in 1949, to take Bianco's date, does seem now to 
be on a more or less straight stretch of the track, heading, we 
are told, towards the four modernisations; although a few 
aboard, far from the driver's cabin it must be said, want to 
head also towards a fifth - democracy - through which they say 
you must pass in order to reach the others. That is very 
uncertain, and it seems unlikely that the Chinese locomotive of 
revolution will actually pass that way. But at least it does 
seem to be heading somewhere reachable, not Utopia. 
Having momentarily dashed off headlong myself in pursuit 
of Marx's metaphor of revolution, I must return briefly for a 
few final ruminations about the key word in my title. Revolu-
tion can be taken to mean only basic social and political trans-
formation of societies, such as are recorded in the history 
books around years like 1789, 1917 and 1949. But one may 
indeed question, as I have been doing, just how much trans-
formation in the end really takes place by means of such 
revolutions. 'New presbyter is but old priest writ large', 
Milton wrote bitterly in the midst of the Puritan revolution in 
seventeenth-century England, and we can readily transpose 
his terms to fit other revolutions, seeing Stalin and Mao as old 
Tsar or Emperor, and party commissars or cadres as old style 
bureaucrats, writ large. Such parallels are far from reliable 
guides to the reality of revolution, and it would be foolish to 
attempt to deny the immensity of the social and political changes 
which have in fact followed from the great revolutions. But 
still, there is a problem about the transforming powers of 
socio-political revolution. 
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Alfred Cobban in an iconoclastic inaugural lecture talked 
of the myth of the French Revolution, not thereby denying 
that great and dramatic events had actually occurred in France 
after 1789, but arguing that the people - the class if you like 
- effectively in power after those events were much the same 
as before, and that the revolutionary decade and its Napoleonic 
aftermath, so far from carrying French society forward more 
decisively and rapidly out of one historical stage into another 
more advanced state, could as well be said to have slowed it 
down. 17 This is a far from unquestioned or popular view 
(especially in France), but it is one which does remind us that 
there are many myths embedded in all history, and nowhere 
perhaps more so today than in the history of revolutions. A 
too tight definition or criterion of revolution creates its own 
kinds of myths. A tough-minded analyst such as Barrington 
Moore can say of the American Revolution of the late eighteenth 
century that 'since it did not result in any fundamental changes 
in the structure of society, there are grounds for asking 
whether it deserves to be called a revolution at all' .
18 I find 
such a use of the term as altogether too purist and restrictive 
and am certainly here using the word in a far looser sense than 
that implied in Moore's comment. We should not get cabined 
and confined within such phrases as 'the structure of the 
society', or swept along too far by words such as 'transform-
ation', but remain ready to recognise that revolution, at least 
in the sense of social, political, economic changes which pro-
foundly affect the individual lives of men and women over a 
long period of time, can work in very various ways and direct-
ions sometimes downwards from above, as for example in Meiji 
Japan or the Shah's Iran, or contrariwise, as in today's Iran, 
to assert non-modernising faiths and objectives which are yet, 
in a real sense, revolutionary in their impact. The word, the 
concept, cannot meaningfully be made captive to one view of 
history or one criterion of historical change. 
One final example to help justify my admittedly loose use 
of the term for China. J.P. Harrison, early on in his text on 
the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, The Long March to 
Power, writes that 'during the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies at least four major revolutions had been proceeding 
simultaneously in China. It is as if the intellectual, political, 
economic and social changes that took centuries to occur in 
the West have been compressed into several decades in China'. 
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These changes constitute for Harrison, the four main streams 
of revolution in modern Chinese history. He sees them as 
ultimately all flowing in roughly the same direction, towards a 
socialist defined, communist party-led model of modernity, so 
that even for Harrison, it must be said, it comes down to one 
revolution in the end. But he does distinguish, as it were, 
revolutions within the revolution. 
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That essentially is what my own argument in the end comes 
down to also, but the revolutions I wish to distinguish are 
fewer and rather different from those suggested by Harrison. 
I have already hinted at the main distinction I wish to make, 
that is between the elite-led, the politically organised and 
ideologically committed revolution (whether Confucian, Kuomin-
tang or Communist) on the one hand, and the largely unarticu-
lated, at best loosely organised, popular revolution of the 
masses on the other. There has at certain times and places 
been a very close interconnection and interdependence between 
these two revolutions, as during the Yenan years when the 
Communist Party did indeed tap the enormous insurrectionary 
energies of the north China peasants who formed the tide that 
carried it to power by 1949. About this there can be no dis-
agreement. But it did not thereby absolutely channel and 
control those peasant popular energies, nor thereby complete 
the revolution. In important respects the peasant revolution 
was, and has remained, very distinct from that recorded in 
the history books around such years as 1911, 1919, 1927 and 
1949, and around such organisations as the T'ung Meng Hui, 
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. It has been 
a revolution concerned with parochial rather than national 
objectives, with the re-creation of local self-sufficiency, order 
and justice on a pattern believed to have existed in the recent 
or an ideal past, before government and landlords and local 
power wielders became oppressive and grasping beyond toler-
able bounds; a revolution inspired as much by religious and 
moral convictions about the social order as by any politically 
definable objectives concerned with progress or modernity 
following some kind of rational, post-Enlightenment model 
the Revolution, in short, of what the social anthropologists 
call the little rather than the great tradition. 
I have been led to put this emphasis on the strength and 
continuing relevance of this alternative, non-elite stream 
within the modern Chinese revolution by two main consider-
ations. One is the problem of determining where exactly the 
great Taiping movement fits into the sequence of modern China's 
revolutionary history; and the second is my reading of a book 
with the engaging title of China Turned Right Side Up, written 
by Ralph Thaxton and published last year by Yale University 
Press. Let me look briefly at each of these in turn in an 
attempt to buttress my main propositions that we should not 
view the history of the Chinese revolution too narrowly along 
one particular perspective of change and progress, nor try to 
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fit it too neatly within one particular package of revolutionary 
type. 
First the Taiping movement, that vast peasant uprising 
which challenged the existing Confucian orthodoxy and the 
ruling Ch'ing dynasty over the years 1851-1864, proclaiming 
a new quasi-Christian religious faith and a social economic 
order based on agrarian communism; proclaiming itself also to 
be a new kind of dynasty, whose legitimacy derived not from 
any mandate from heaven but from its own direct divinity 
through its leader Hung, the younger brother of Jesus Christ. 
Although eventually defeated and destroyed, after the loss of 
millions of lives and the devastation of some of the most pros-
perous parts of China, the Taiping brought about significant 
changes in the lower balance within the existing Ch'ing state 
and helped create the conditions for its eventual overthrow 
fifty years later. They certainly, therefore, have a signifi-
cant place in the pantheon of the modern Chinese revolutionary 
movement. 
But historians (and here I have to confess that I am draw-
ing only on Western historians of the movement, though I 
think that much of what I have to say may af ply also to recent 
Chinese historical writing on the Taiping), 2 seem in some-
thing of a dilemma as to where exactly to place the Taiping in 
the development of the modern Chinese Revolution. J. K. 
Fairbank for example writes in his United States and China 
'the Chinese Revolution of today really goes back to the Taiping 
rebellion of 1851-64, a full lifetime before Marxism entered 
China ... Modern China's revolution is unintelligible without 
reference to the Taiping effort to destroy Confucianism and 
why it failed'. 21 Maurice Meisner in his text Mao's China says, 
'Taiping rebels in the mid-nineteenth century had been the 
first to mount a revolutionary challenge to the dominance of 
the gentry and the entire Confucian socio-political order' 
although, he adds, 'the modern history of the Chinese revolu-
tion did not truly begin until near the turn of the century, 
when members of the gentry began to turn against the Confucian 
values and ways of their own class'. 22 Thus, for Meisner, 
revolution in modern China begins with the Taipings, and they 
mount a truly revolutionary challenge to the old order, but the 
modern history of that revolution begins later. Wolfgang 
Franke sees justification for regarding the Taiping as pre-
cursors of the revolutionary movement of the twentieth cen-
tury as does Eric Wolf, while Bianco says of them that they 
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were 'in a sense the precursors of the communists'. 
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Although none of these writers regard the Taiping exactly 
as modern revolutionaries (though some get close to it) , it 
seems fair to say that all are striving to somehow fit the Taiping 
movement into the line of modern revolution which culminates, 
as Bianco puts it so clearly later in his book , in 1949. But the 
Taiping really represent, I suggest , a fundamentally different 
line or tradition of revolt or revolution - if you are prepared 
to accord them that label, and many historians still are - i.e . 
a religiously inspired, non-rational, pre-modern movement 
which is quite distinct, and indeed far removed from, the 
essential (I do not say the always consistently maintained, but 
the essential) rational program of secular revolution which the 
communist movement basically stands for. 
As so often in history, one cannot draw the line with 
absolute precision and certainty. In the last years of the 
Taiping one of their leaders produced a very rational, modern 
looking paper program of innovation , but this stemmed from 
the special personal experience of this Taiping figure, not fran 
the core of the movement; on the other side there have been 
Messianic and irrational qualities enough in the course of the 
communist led revolution. But in the long term and in the 
ultimate balance, the two movements represent, I maintain, 
fundamentally very different world views, very different 
philosophies of revolution, very different ideals of social order. 
There is truly a great gulf, not just of time, separating the 
Taiping from the communist revolution, and it is, I believe, 
one of the myths of modern Chinese history to see them as in 
any real sense the precursors of the modernising revolution 
of the twentieth century. 
I quote from one of the most revolutionary documents in 
modern Chinese history. 
The methods of government inaugurated by 
the Sung and Ming dynasties upon investi-
gation reveal nothing that is of any practical 
use or that may be of advantage to us. 
Changes must be made according to the 
necessities of the time. We must select sub-
jects of Western knowledge as will keep us in 
touch with the time, and diligently study 
and practice them in order to place our 
country abreast with other countries . Let 
us strive towards advancement and progress. 2 ~ 
This is part of the edict drafted by Kang Yu- wei and issued by 
the young Kuang Ksu emperor on 11 June 1898, thus beginning 
the abortive Hundred Days of Reform. For a Chinese emperor 
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to be stating in an imperial edict - that is, in the ultimate 
expression of his administrative status and authority - that we 
can learn nothing from the past, that we must turn to the outer 
world and learn from it, that we must commit ourselves to a 
continuing program of advancement and progress, this surely 
was truly revolutionary. This edict uses the same kind of 
language that the present-day rulers use, that is the language 
of progress, of modernisation, of learning truths from facts; 
but this is by no means the language of the Taiping, who were 
intent upon establishing a heavenly kingdom of great peace, a 
theocratic state concerned less with national wealth and power 
than with shared agrarian subsistence and with religious orth::>-
doxy. The Taiping have their place in modern Chinese his-
tory, and in the history of revolution in modern China; but 
despite certain superficially shared characteristics and object-
ives they represent a different kind of revolution from that of 
the ruling elite, whether that elite bears a Confucian or a 
communist label. 
I turn now briefly to Thaxton's book, which is a study of 
the peasant contribution to, and relationship with, the com-
munist revolution in north China during the 1930s and 1940s, 
concentrating on a particular key region or base area, the 
Taihang mountains . Despite some very real weaknesses in the 
quality of the evidence available to him and his own often over-
zealous use of that evidence I think Thaxton's book does show 
convincingly enough that the non-elite tradition of peasant 
radicalism - of revolution as he consistently calls it - sub-
merged and unarticulated though it usually was, remained 
strong within Chinese society into the twentieth century, and 
was far from being simply taken over, mobilised and tapped 
by the communist party in its build-up of strength in north 
China after the Long March and during the war with Japan. 
Of course, Thaxton agrees, the peasant base and the com-
munist party's ability to draw effectively on this tradition 
played a vital role in its victory of 1949. But rather than 
simply looking for the methods used by the party to bring 
peasant expectations into line with its own ideology and goals, 
he argues that we need to examine more closely how the 
peasants imposed their own more local revolutionary objectives 
upon party programs. Peasant values and practices both 
set limits on, and shaped the contours of, revolutionary 
change, he maintains, and the Chinese communists had 
frequently to endorse in party guidelines peasant outpourings 
that were by no means originally embraced by party leadership. 
'The peasants', he says, 'left the stamp of their own convic-
tions on communist party policy and gave it a uniquely 
popular twist, a little tradition imprint'. 2 5 
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The detail of Thaxton's argument we have not time to go 
into, but the book comes down to asserting that there were in 
a real sense two revolutions developing in the north China 
plain by the 1940s - developing in close relationship to one 
another certainly, but yet different and distinct. His book is 
in fact an application to China of the conclusions derived by 
James Scott from his study of agrarian revolt in Southeast 
Asian countries, that within every great tradition revolt having 
mass support there is also a little tradition revolt that threatens 
to usurp the movement for its parochial ends. This 'revolutbn 
in the revolution', says Scott, 
is typically denounced by radical elites as 
adventurism, deviation, or anarchy ... The 
goals of purely little tradition rebellions 
have something of an ahistorical, permanent 
quality to them, like animism. When self-
consciously revolutionary elites emerge to 
link up with these older patterns, they 
tend to add a new dimension to the revolt 
but not to eliminate the parochial forms in 
the process. 2 6 
Thus Scott, and that is the kind of picture of the revolution-
ary scene in north China which Thaxton seeks to portray. His 
portrayal is certainly fuzzy, highly coloured, distorted in 
parts; but the perspective does seem revealing, worth exam-
ining carefully. The reviewer of his book in the Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs is critical, but judiciously so, re-
specting his aim to put forward an important interpretation of 
the Chinese Revolution and to correct the over-emphasis on 
party history and the consequent neglect of the main partici-
pants, the peasants. 'While the argument presented here is 
not completely convincing', says this reviewer, 'the thesis 
itself deserves serious consideration'. 2 7 I am certainly glad 
to use it to support my own general argument that the revolu-
tionary process in modern China does not converge clearly 
along only one path towards ore end, under one leadership. 
Of course you may object that really there is no separate 
tradition of peasant revolution as distinct from peasant 
rebellion; that peasants, whether like the Taiping in the mid-
nineteenth century or Thaxton's Taihang peasants in mid-
twentieth, do not become genuinely revolutionary unless and 
until mobilised under a more class-conscious, nationally-aware 
leadership espousing a far-reaching program of political and 
social change. It is, I suppose, a matter of definition. In any 
very long historical perspective, such as the study of Chinese 
history fosters, great mass peasant uprisings may indeed appear 
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in the end far more likely to re-create than to transform the 
old order - though one must admit that they can give it a 
very vigorous shake-up while they're about it - witness the 
Taiping. But we need to recall that our historical perspective 
on these 'rare but momentous' social revolutionary phenomena 
is a good deal shorter than it is on the long Chinese tradition 
of peasant rebellion and uprisings. and we may reflect that 
perhaps revolutions loom parger in our Marxist-modulated minds 
partly because they are so much closer. The future historian 
may conclude that. despite their undoubted impact on the soc-
ieties experiencing them, the transforming capacities of revol-
ution are limited, that like rebellions they re-create as much as 
they transform. We do not need to wait on the future historian 
for that elucidation, of course. A contemporary of both Meadows 
and Marx, quite as subtle and perceptive an observer of revol-
utions and rebellions as either of them, said it clearly enough 
about the great French revolution, and his insights seem to me 
to apply equally well to the Russian and the Chinese revol-
utions. 
For the Revolution has had two phases very 
distinct - the first in which the French seemed 
to wish the abolition of everything in the past; 
and the second, in which they wished to re-
sume a part of which they had given up. There 
were in the 'old order' a great number of laws 
and political habits which disappeared at one 
stroke in 1789, and which reappeared some 
years later; just as certain rivers plunge 
beneath the surface of the ground to reappear 
a little further on, causing the same waters to 
visit new banks. 28 
Thus wrote Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic on revolution 
L'Ancien Regime. 
Although his study is of peasants in north China before 
1949, Thaxton does raise a pertinent question about contem-
porary China when he asks: 'Is it not possible that the 
conception of folk revolution that characterised the pre-1949 
communist party relationships with the peasantry, has sur-
vived the intra-party wars over the proper ordering of the 
post-liberation People's Republic's state? Is that potent trad-
ition still with us today?' 29 I have already drawn attention 
to the article on the production responsibility system and the 
future of collective farming which suggests, to me at least, 
that the answer to that question may be a qualified yes - that 
slowly, massively, the peasant has helped turn the party away 
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from the grand transforming policies it attempted during the 
Maoist period, and that the ultimate structure of Chinese agri-
culture resulting from the process of revolution is likely to 
reflect peasant aspirations and objectives quite as much as 
those of the revolutionary elite of the great tradition. 
The recently published autobiography of Liang Heng, Son 
of the Revolution (a fairly prodigal son of the revolution, it 
must be said), recounts a number of experiences anong peasants 
which seem to me to reflect the continuing strength of this 
little tradition within the revolution, and I conclude my main 
argument with an illustration from his account. 
When aged about fifteen, Liang Heng was rusticated, 
'liberated', with his father for prolonged re-education in the 
countryside, to help cut off the tail of capitalism by bringing 
revolutionary knowledge to peasants in one of the most isolated 
regions of China. The peasants came to respect his father 
deeply and brought their dilemmas about official policies to him. 
'Old Liang', they said 'we don't understand. Why is raising 
chickens and ducks rotten capitalism? How can we buy oil and 
salt if we don't sell eggs?' Ore thirty-five year old ba~lor com-
plained: 'I have almost two hundred yuan now but if I can't 
raise more than one pig a year I'll be sixty before I can look 
for a wife. Do they want me to dream about women for the 
rest of my life?'. But at that time old Liang cannot protect 
them against the power of the local party secretary and a 
remote central government intent on rooting out every sup-
posed vestige of capitalism, even if represented by only a few 
privately owned pigs and ducks nibbling on public land. The 
peasants respond, rebel, as best they can: 'Better to eat a 
laying hen yourself than surrender to the government, they 
reasoned', reports Liang, so there was a great slaughter in 
the village of pigs and ducks. But it is a bitter and at times 
violent business even in this small village. 'We poor peasants 
don't know how to write, but we keep our account with our 
bellies' says one defiantly. But for the time being, at least, 
the party and its cadres, the 'they' of the thirty-five year old 
bachelor's complaint, triumph, and the official anti-capitalist 
policy is enforced. But popular res-istance and resentment is 
clear in this confrontation, observed by this young son of an 
intellectual set down for a time among peasants struggling 
still to maintain their kind of revolution. 30 
Recent developments, not just in respect of the peasants 
whom I have emphasised but more generally throughout 
Chinese society, suggest that, for good or ill, non-elite gen-
erated pressures are still at work upon the course of revolu-
tion in China; that the developing actuality of revolution and 
22 
change there cannot accurately be depicted as moving clearly 
along any single, well defined revolutionary path; that the 
transformation of China's political and social structures is prov-
ing to be in fact a very unpredictable, ungeneralisable process 
and that, if there has been just one revolution in China at 
least it has been at least many faceted, if not downright cham-
eleon like. 
The history of revolution in China, from the Taiping on-
wards, needs to be written with a full awareness, such as 
Meadows had, of the immense, continuing strength of tradition, 
both little and great, within Chinese society and the Chinese 
consciousness. Revolution is indeed one of the means by which 
human societies have moved on through their histories; but 
locomotives are not the only means of social transport and pro-
gress, and the history of the Chinese revolution, more clearly 
perhaps than the history of any other major social revolution, 
reminds us forcefully how very uncertain both their speed and 
direction can be, and that there is no single gauge or track, 
either coming out of the past or leading into the future. 
My main concern has been to raise questions about the 
accurate historical understanding of the Chinese and their 
revolutions. I cannot presume to try to depict the Chinese 
experience of their revolutions, though an account such as 
that of Liang Heng from which I quoted serves to illustrate 
something of the vast range of personal fulfillment and tragedy 
that go to make up that experience. So does the literature of 
the wounded, as it has been called, and some of the recently 
published accounts of Chinese-speaking Western journalists ir. 
China. I turn in conclusion, however, to a recent American 
visitor who spoke no Chinese, was there for only a relatively 
short time yet wrote a book about it - almost the archetypal 
tourist one could say, though a favoured, sensitive and obser-
vant one. 
In his book, Chinese Encounters, recording his visit to 
China in 1978, the American playwright Arthur Miller commmted 
that 'it seems the Chinese have a greater ability than we to 
endure inconclusiveness'. Simply to endure, one might say. 
But Miller's comment, which reflects his deeply troubled, ten-
acious concern to understand the continuing dilemmas and 
uncertainties of direction in post Cultural Revolution China, 
seems apt enough. 'The truth was', he concluded, 'that 
Marxist-Maoism, the science of reality, had left them stunned 
in a nightmare, a directionless space. All that was sure was 
that anything was possible'. 31 Now, nearly ten years after 
the death of Mao, for whom revolution was a drama of passion, 
the Chinese appear to be moving, cautiously but steadily, 
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towards a less passionate, more gradualist kind of revolution. 
'Deng's Quiet Revolution' Newsweek called it in one of its 
issues reporting on President Reagan's recent visit. 32 Whether 
that revolution will survive Deng, or whether China will re-
turn to some new, heaven-storming Maoist model we cannot yet 
know. My guess is that it will not; that a generation and 
more after the triumphs of 1949 and the traumas of all the cam-
paigns and struggles since, a tolerable balance between gov-
erned and governing, between 'they' and thirty-five year old 
bachelors seeking to save the price of a bride, is at last emerg-
ing. If that guess is wrong (as Miller clearly fears it may be) , 
if chaos does come again, I will guess further by predicting 
that overt rebellion from below, of the kind Meadows general-
ised from, is a not impossible development. 'Rebellion is in 
China the old, often exercised, legitimate and constitutional 
means of stopping arbitrary and vicious legislation and admin-
istration', wrote Meadows. 'To say that an industrious and 
cultivated people should have no right whatever, in any way, 
of checking misgovernment and tyranny which must destroy 
its cultivation and its industry, and ultimately its very exist-
ence as a people, is to maintain a proposition so monstrous 
that I merely state it.' 33 The long tradition of popular rebel-
lion in the form Meadows knew it, may be now dormant but is 
not necessarily totally dead or defunct. Of course in modern 
China, old style, Taiping-type millenarian rebellion would be 
an anachronism; but even a modern autocracy, claiming its 
mandate from the people rather than from heaven, is likely, 
within the Chinese tradition, to be subject to some kind of 
checks and balances to hold it back from any long term, intol-
erable despotism. 
Arthur Miller was heir to a revolution that was above all 
else about individual liberty and constraints on the powers of 
government - which some see as what all true revolutions must 
basically be about, 3 ~ a view I share. Miller earnestly sought 
for signs of an emerging rule of law and a right of individual 
dissent. This is,I think. an unlikely, or at best very limited, 
prospect in China. Yet I do not doubt that, consistent with 
their own tradition of autocratic yet morally responsible and 
ultimately accountable government, the Chinese people will 
ensure that revolution in China never remains simply what the 
ruling elite, Communist, Confucian or whatever, decrees. 
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THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by 
Chinese residents in Australia and others in honour of the 
late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, 
Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to 
honour for all time the memory of a great Australian who 
rendered valuable services to China, and to improve cultural 
relations between China and Australia. The foundation of 
the lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Consul-
ate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts of Mr 
William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, 
of Melbourne; Mr F. J. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of 
Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 the lec-
ture was associated with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, 
but in the latter year the responsibility for the management 
of the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National 
University, and the lectures delivered since that date have 
been given under the auspices of the University. 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: W .P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the 
Lectureship and a review of Dr Morrison's life in China. 
10 May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular 
Reference to Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J. S. MacDonald, The History and Development of 
Chinese Art. 3 May 1934. 
Fourth: W.P. Chen, The New Culture Movement in China. 
10 May 1935. 
Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and 
Chinese Abroad, 2 September 1936. 
Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, China Today: With Special Reference 
to Higher Education. 4 May 1937. 
Seventh: A. F. Barker, The Impact of Western Industrialism 
on China. 17 May 1939. 
Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 
5 June 1939. 
28 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes 
of the Westerner. 29 May 1949. 
Tenth: W. G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese 
Democracy. 5 June 1941. 
Eleventh: D. B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 
September 1948. * 
Twelfth: J. K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 
1949. 
Thirteenth: C. P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in 
China. 19 March 1951. 
Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and 
Work. 4 December 1952. 
Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West. 20 
October 1953. 
Sixteenth: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture. 
27 July 1954. 
Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D. 25-27) 
and the Northern Barbarians. 2 November 1955. * 
Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-
Kang and Lung-Men. 17 October 1956 · * 
Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The 
Chinese Civil Service. 4 November 1957. 
Twentieth: A.R. Davies, The Narrow Lane: Some Observations 
on the Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 
1958. 
Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 
6 October 1959. * 
Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: 
The Golden Age. 5 October 1960. * 
Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with 
other Parts of Asia in Ancient Times. l August 1961. * 
Twenty-fourth: N. G.D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in 
Chinese Linguistics. 22 November 1962. * 
Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese For-
eign Policy. 3 October 1963. 
Twenty-Sixth: Wang Ling, Calendar, Cannon and Clock in the 
Cultural Relations between Europe and China. 18 November 
1964. 
Twenty-seventh: A.M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy -
Success or Failure? 9 August 1966. * 
Twenty-eighth: J. W. de Jong, Buddha's Word in China. 18 
October 1967. * 
Twenty-ninth: J.D. Frodsham, New Perspectives in Chinese 
Literature. 23 July 1968. * 
Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, The Assimilation of the Chinese in 
Australia. 6 November 1969. * 
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Thirty-first: K.A. Wittfogel, Agriculture: A Key to the 
Understanding of Chinese Society, Past and Present. 6 
April 1970. * 
Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's 
Discovery of East Asia. 3 November 1971. * 
Thirty-third: Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China, 
6 September 1972. 
Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big 
Country: Views of Three Chinese Emperors. 13 November 
1973.* 
Thirty-fifth: Jerome Ch 'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary 
China. 22 July 1974. 
Thirty-sixth: Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Nature: Idea 
and Reality. 3 September 1975. 
Thirty-seventh: Lo Hui-min, The Tradition and Prototypes 
of the China-Watcher. 27 October 1976. * 
Thirty-eighth: Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Politics in 
Modern China. 17 August 1977. 
Thirty-ninth: Mark Elvin, Self-Liberation and Self-Immolation 
in Modern Chinese Thought. 13 September 1978. * 
Fortieth: Wang Gungwu, Power, Rights and Duties in Chinese 
History. 19 September 1979. * 
Forty-first: Dr Fang Chao-ying, The Great Wall of China: 
Keeping Out or Keeping In? 5 June 1980. 
Forty-second: T'ien Ju-K'ang, Moslem Rebellion in China: A 
Yunnan Controversy. 17 June 1981. * 
Forty-third: Alan Thorne, China and Australia: Forty Thou-
sand Years of Contact. 4 August 1982. 
Forty-fourth: Chan Hok-lam, Control of Publishing in China, 
Past and Present. 24 August 1983. * 
Forty-fifth: J. S. Gregory, The Chinese and their Revolutions. 
8 August 1984. * 
* Available from Contemporary China Centre, Research 
School of Pacific Studies. 
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